Intellectual Property

Figurative trademarks: be aware of the extent of your protection

The judges of the Paris Court of Appeal, ruling on a referral from the Court of Cassation, adopted a strict approach to similarities between a figurative trademark and a later , semi-figurative trademark in a dispute between two companies specialized in ready-to-wear clothing.

 

The company Compagnie Financière de Californie (“Compagnie de Californie”), which specializes in street wear chic clothing, is the owner of the trademarks on the sign, in particular for clothing products.

In 2013, the company noted that International Sport Fashion, also active in the fashion industry, had registered and used a trademark that it believes to be similar to its own:

 

The signs in question have the shape of an eagle’s head, without detail, reproduced in black and white within a circle.

In order to obtain compensation for the damage it considers to have suffered, Compagnie de Californie brought an action for infringement.

 

After having been dismissed at first instance and on appeal, the company turned to the Court of Cassation, which referred the case back to the trial judges after partial cassation.

The referring Court of Appeal first compared the trademarks in question. Its analysis is rigorous, particularly from a conceptual standpoint: it considers that the trademark of Compagnie de Californie refers to “the dark side of the bird of prey while the other refers to the image of a much less aggressive bird” (certainly due to the presence of a closed beak).

 

The court points out, among other things, that visually, these birds’ heads are not facing the same direction and that one has the beak closed and the other open.

 

On the phonetic level, the court notes, unsurprisingly, that the mark at issue will be pronounced “Eagle Square” in reference to the verbal element it contains, which will not be the case for the earlier mark.

 

The court, therefore, considers that there is no likelihood of confusion between the marks.

 

Next, it examines the question of the exploitation by International Sport Fashion of its mark for clothing products. The Court takes into account all possible elements such as the packaging which contains the goods. The name “EAGLE SQUARE” is affixed to the packaging; it, therefore, considers that there is no likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers.

It also states that the contested sign which appears by itself on some of the articles is each time bicoloured, “inducing a caesura in the sign”, which gives an overall impression, very different from the earlier mark.

 

The court, therefore, did not grant the applications of Compagnie de Californie.

 

Thus, with respect to figurative marks, it is necessary to meticulously estimate the chances of success of an infringement action, since great similarities are generally required to recognize the likelihood of confusion.

This case shows that even marks with a comparable style (presence of a bird in a circle, with only the head entirely painted black) can coexist in the market.

It is questionable whether the Court of Appeal would have taken a different approach had International Sport Fashion affixed the only black and white eagle head to its products. The question also arises as to whether the outcome might have been partially different had  California Company also registered, as a trademark, its coloured eagle (which can be found in red on its official website https://www.compagniedecalifornie.com/).

 

Therefore, in addition to a detailed analysis of the chances of success before bringing an action, it is also necessary to protect the trademark as exploited, taking into account its variants, so as to benefit from the widest possible scope of protection.

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Questions and answers about the new opposition procedure before the French trademark office INPI

Since December 11, 2019, the French opposition procedure has evolved. We provide an update on the changes and questions.

 

Key elements about the French opposition against trademarks

Typically, as soon as a trademark application could infringe a prior trademark right, it is possible to prevent its registration by opposing said trademark application directly before the French Trademark Office INPI.

This was the case before the reform and it hasn’t changed since: an opposition can be filed against a French trademark application or an international trademark designating France.

The time limits to act remain unchanged and are as follow:

– Regarding the registration of a French trademark application, an opposition must be filed within two months of the publication of said application in the French Official Bulletin of Industrial Property (BOPI).

– In the case of an international trademark application designating France, the opposition request is filed within two months of the publication of the registration in the WIPO Gazette of International Trademarks.

 

This procedure has evolved since December 11, 2019, offering a new opposition process.

 

In which situations does the new opposition procedure apply?

– Applicable to French trademark applications filed as of December 11, 2019, for trademarks published in the BOPI as of January 3, 2020.

– Applicable to French designations of international trademark applications, published in the WIPO Gazette as of December 11, 2020.

 

What is the purpose of this reform?

This reform was implemented in order to reinforce the adversarial principle, by allowing the parties to exchange and compare their arguments throughout the procedure, on the one hand; and on the other hand, to support the analysis of evidence of use of the earlier trademark.

 

What are the changes brought about by this new opposition procedure?

If you wish to oppose a trademark application filed after December 11, 2019, you can now :

Base your opposition on other rights than trademark rights (which were not previously taken into account) such as well-known trademarks, company names or corporate names, trade names, signs or domain names;

Invoke several previous rights in the same opposition (provided they belong to the same owner) ;

Ground your opposition within one month by filing the statement of grounds on which the opposition is based. At the end of this period, the opposition is notified to the opposite party. However, it is impossible to extend the scope of the opposition during this period, either to other goods or services referred to in the initial application, or to other prior rights.

 

 

  • On the rights and grounds that can be invoked

What are the rights and grounds for the opposition?

Prior to the reform, the rights and grounds on which an opposition could be based were as follows:

– Earlier trademark;

Geographical indication or application for a geographical indication;

– Infringement to the name, image or reputation of a local authority.

With the reform, the following previous rights are added:

– Well known trademark;

Corporate name;

– Trade name, sign and domain name ;

– Infringement to the reputation of a public establishment of a public establishment for inter-municipal cooperation;

– Name of a public entity ;

– Trademark registered by an agent without authorization.

 

Is the examination of evidence of use deeper?

Genuine use, or proper reasons for non-use, must be reported for each good and service invoked in support of the opposition. Thus, the earlier trademark will only be deemed to be registered for the goods or services for which this demonstration has been made. The INPI is now in charge to carry out said examination. In the past, only the courts were in charge.

 

As far as domain names are concerned, since the GDRP the Whois records are anonymized. How can it be justified that the person who made the domain name reservation has the right to file an opposition?

If the Whois record is anonymous, then in addition to the anonymous Whois record, any document establishing the existence and identity of the domain name holder can be provided. It can be for example the certificate from the Registrar or an invoice showing the reservation of the domain name.

 

  • About the procedure

Which are the changes in the course of the procedure?

A phase of exchanges, also known as the “instruction phase” is set up. It starts with the notification of the opposition to the applicant. This instruction may include up to three phases of exchanges between the parties.

From now on, the procedure is no longer confined to a 6-month period. It is however subject to the principle of « silence is tantamount to rejection », within a period of 3 months. This means that if the INPI has not ruled within 3 months following the end of the exchange between the parties, the opposition is rejected.

The duration will therefore vary according to the number of replies from the parties, but in any case may not exceed 13 months.

 

What are the cases of suspension of the procedure?

Suspension is possible in several cases:

– When one of the rights invoked in support of the opposition has not yet been accepted or is subject to a legal action;

– At the initiative of the French trademark Office, the INPI.

The entire procedure is suspended when the opposition is based on several rights, even if the suspension concerns only one of the rights invoked.

The duration of the suspension in the event of a joint request by the parties is extended to 4 months and renewable twice, i.e. 12 months in total, instead of 6 months in the past.

 

  • On the role of the INPI

Does the French Trademark Office INPI have more power in the new procedure?

This new opposition procedure greatly strengthens the role of the INPI.

Before the new procedure, the role conferred on the INPI in the examination of proof of use was limited: apart from cases where the lack of use was proven, the opposition procedure was not closed.

At present, where the applicant requests proof of use of the earlier trademark, it is up to the INPI to decide on the genuine nature of the use of the earlier trademark for each of the goods and services invoked in support of the opposition.

 

This reform reinforces the adversarial principle and, consequently, the protection of the rights of trademark owners.

 

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All concerned: works generated by artificial intelligence

Legal issues relating to the ownership of inventions and works created using artificial intelligence (or “AI”) are at the forefront for a variety of businesses.

The first step is to define what artificial intelligence is.

Artificial intelligence is the implementation of a number of techniques aimed at enabling machines to imitate a form of real intelligence. Artificial intelligence is present in a large number of fields of application. It is now used in some cases to create works through algorithmic processing. Such is, for example, the case of the robot painter named E-David, developed by a German university, whose calculation algorithms allow it to paint canvases that are very similar to those painted by humans.

 

Positive law: the importance of human beings

Intellectual property law was primarily designed to protect the fruits of human intellectual labor, therefore it has had difficulty adapting to the new tools that have emerged as a result of digital evolution.

 

AI has further blurred the distinction between creator, tools and creation. For some, it is only a tool, for others it has a fundamentally innovative character to which the law should adapt.

In France, the Intellectual Property Code imposes a condition of originality for the works to be protected by copyright. In addition, the works must reflect the expression of the author’s personality. These criteria imply that a work can only be created by a human, possibly assisted by a machine which then serves as a tool in the creation of the work.

 

Thus, if the work is only created by an AI, the qualification of work cannot be used and copyright protection is not applicable. The same will be true for an invention generated by a machine that cannot be patented.

European law requires the copyright to reflect the “author’s own intellectual creation”. However, in European countries there is no universal approach to the requirement of a human author. The United Kingdom, for example, provides protection for computer-generated works and the author is the person who arranges for the creation of the work, so the authorship is attributed to the programmer.

 

Thus the inventor cannot be a company or a machine. There is therefore a discrepancy between the obligation to identify the real inventor and the person supposed to be the inventor. It is thus affirmed that decisions regarding the dissemination of the invention will be made by “the owner of the AI machine”.

 

American copyright law is still strict regarding works made with AI. For example, it has been stated that “the Office will not register works produced by a machine or simple mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative contribution or intervention by a human author” (Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices of 2014).

 

Additionally, in a decision of April 22, 2020 concerning an application mentioning an AI tool, DABUS, as the sole inventor, the USPTO recalled that the inventor must be a human.

 

Are we heading towards an evolution of law, more in line with technological developments?

 

The question is whether it would be appropriate to modify the intellectual property system in the light of technological developments or to create a sui generis right of AI.

A WIPO meeting on law reform in this area, which will provide an opportunity to discuss the above-mentioned issues will take place in July 2020,

In addition, the European Commission published a White Paper on February 19, 2020 after presenting the ethical guidelines for trustworthy AI on 8 April, 2019. It defined AI, as well asits global guidelines in the regulation of artificial intelligence.

It had already adopted the “Civil Law Rules on Robotics – European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017”.

The latter stressed that “considering that, now that humanity is at the dawn of an era in which increasingly sophisticated robots, intelligent algorithms, androids and other forms of artificial intelligence appear to be on the verge of triggering a new industrial revolution which is likely to affect all strata of society, it is of fundamental importance for legislators to examine the legal and ethical consequences and effects of such a revolution, without stifling innovation”.

 

In addition, a legal personality for machines (electronic personality) could be recognized which would amend the copyright.

Let us recall that currently the only solution, in innovative fields, is to refer to industrial secrecy to preserve the innovations made by AI.

Thus, a reform or clarification of the law to respond to new issues in a more secure manner would be welcome.

To be continued!

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The lovelinesss of the European Union: to obtain in one Member State a declaration of counterfeiting for acts committed in another Member State

CJEU – September 5, 2019

AMS Neve Ltd, Barnett Waddingham Trustees, Mark Crabtree c/. Heritage Audio SL, Pedro Rodríguez Arriba,

 

It is possible to bring an actionbefore a national court with the purpose proving an infringement of the EU trademark in that Member State, even if the third party has advertised and marketed his goods in another Member State.

That is the answer given by the Court of Justice of the European Union to the preliminary ruling question concerning the interpretation of Article 97(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of February 26, 2009 on the European Union trade mark.

That reference was made in the context of a dispute between the parties:

The applicants : AMS Neve, a company founded in the United Kingdom, for manufacturing and marketing audio equipment, represented by its director Mr Crabtree.  Barnett Waddingham Trustees “BW Trustees” is the trustee;

versus

The defendants : Heritage Audio, a Spanish company also marketing audio equipment, represented by Mr Rodríguez Arribas

 

concerning an infringement action for alleged infringement of rights conferred, inter alia, by an European Union trade mark.

The applicants are the owners of the European Union trademark and of two trademarks registered in the United Kingdom.

Having discovered that Heritage Audio was marketing imitations of AMS Neve products bearing or referring to a sign identical or similar to the said EU and national trademarks and was advertising those products, they brought an action for infringement of an EU trade mark before the Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court in the United Kingdom.

In order to prove the infringement in the United Kingdom, the applicants provided the documents in support of their action, including in particular the contents of Heritage Audio’s website and its Facebook and Twitter accounts, an invoice issued by Heritage Audio to an individual, resident in the United Kingdom.

Then, in order to prove the  infringement in the European Union, they provided screen shots from that website showing offers for the sale of audio equipment bearing a sign identical or similar to the European Union trademark. They underlined the fact that these offers are in English and that a section entitled “where to buy” is available on the website, listing distributors in various countries. In addition, they argued that Heritage Audio accepts orders from any Member State of the European Union.

While the Court agreed to rule on the protection of national intellectual property rights, it found that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the infringement of the EU trade mark at issue.

 

The appellants appealed against that judgment to the United Kingdom Court of Appeal, which decided to enforce a stay on proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

– Does a national court of a Member State A have jurisdiction to rule on an action for infringement of the EU trademark on account of its advertising and marketing of goods carried out in Member State B?

– If so, what criteria should be taken into account in determining whether the company has taken active measures regarding the infringement?

 

The answers given by the CJEU are as follows:

 

– the plaintiff, depending on whether he chooses to bring the infringement action before the EU trademark court of the defendant’s domicile or before that of the territory in which the act of infringement was committed or threatened to be committed, determines the extent of the territorial jurisdiction of the court seized ;

 

o when the infringement action is based on Article 97(1), it shall cover acts of infringement committed on the territory of the Union (where the action is brought before the court of the defendant’s domicile or, if the defendant is not domiciled in the European Union, in the State in which he is professionally established);

o when it is based on paragraph 5 of the same Article, it shall be limited to acts of infringement committed or threatening to be committed within the territory of a single Member State, namely the Member State of the court seized ;

 

in order to ensure that the acts of which the defendant is accused were committed in the EU , it is necessary to determine where the commercial content was actually made accessible to consumers and professionals for whom it was intended. Whether such advertising and offers subsequently had the effect of purchasing the defendant’s goods, is on the other hand, irrelevant.

 

In the present case, the advertisements and offers referred to by the applicants were aimed at consumers and/or professionals, in particular in the United Kingdom.

In those circumstances, the Court considers that the applicants have the right to bring an infringement action against that third party before a EU trademark court of the Member State within which the consumers or traders to whom that advertising and those offers for sale are directed are located, notwithstanding that that third party took decisions and steps in another Member State to bring about that electronic display.

This possibility of bringing an infringement action before any competent national court  to rule on acts of infringement committed in any Member State is very useful in particular to optimise the costs of proceedings, depending on the national regulations. France, for example, offers irrefutable methods of collecting evidence, such as a bailiff’s report, to establish facts of infringement, at attractive prices.

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UDRP Procedure: manage a domain name portfolio with attention

WIPO, Arbitration and Mediation Center, March 10, 2020, No. D2019-3175, Orfeva SARL v. Vianney d’Alançon.

 

The company Orfeva has specialized for many years in baptism medals. Since 2010, it has been using the domain name ” medailledebapteme.fr ” as the domain name for its official website. Orfeva is also the owner of the French trademark “MEDAILLEDEBAPTEME.FR”.

Orfeva filed a UDRP complaint before the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center against the domain name <medailledebapteme.com>, claiming that it infringes its rights, and asking for a transfer.

This domain name was initially registered on July 21, 2010 by Mr. de Graaf, legal representative of the applicant, then, due to a non-renewal in 2016 – for reasons not explained – this name fell back into the public domain and was reserved on September 26, 2016 by Mr. Vianney d’Alançon to designate his own website for the sale of jewelry and silverware. Mr. Vianney d’Alançon has been the owner of the French trademark “1000 MEDAILLES DE BAPTEME.FR” since December 2015.

The applicant argued that the defendant registered the disputed domain name with perfect knowledge of the existence and use of its earlier mark. Consequently, it considers that the defendant sought to generate confusion with its earlier mark in order to try to divert consumers to its own internet site, by offering them the same goods on a very similar site. In addition, the applicant states that has filed an applicaion by letter, through its Counsel, for the restitution of the disputed domain name, without receiving a reply from the defendant.

The defendant, for its part, maintains that it purchased the domain name <medailledebapteme.com> because it is descriptive of his products and not in order to disrupt the applicant’s business. He argued that the expression ‘baptismal medal’ in everyday language cannot be the subject of a monopoly, being the generic, necessary and customary designation of baptismal medals in the jewellery sector.. Furthermore, he adds that he replied to the letter from the applicant’s counsel, refusing to uphold his claims.  Finally, the defendant argues that there has been no demonstration of customer poaching. In that regard, it states in particular that the applicant’s business is not disrupted by the operation by a third party of the domain name <medaille-de-bapteme.fr> which predates the applicant’s domain name <medaille-de-bapteme.fr>.

The applicant’s position is not followed by the expert who considers that the domain name has not been registered and is not being used in bad faith.

Indeed, the name is descriptive of the Respondent’s activity, which justifies the registration of the domain name. The applicant’s knowledge of prior trade mark rights cannot affect the legitimacy of that registration.

Furthermore, the expert endorses the Respondent’s argument that it was not intended to disrupt the applicant’s business, pointing out that several companies specialising in the sale of christening medals and using very similar domain names coexist peacefully.

 

The expert concludes that the complaint must be rejected. In addition, he states that there is no evidence or reason to suspect any customer poaching or disruption of the applicant’s business operations.  A court of law may rule on this matter, if necessary.

It should therefore be borne in mind that the abandonment of a domain name describing the activity, especially if it includes the highly prized top level domain “.com”, will most certainly be registered by a third party as soon as it falls into the public domain. Indeed, this type of name is generally very coveted, especially because it can enjoy high visibility on search engine results, corresponding to the keywords that Internet users can search for.

The same applies to domain names that reproduce the company’s brand and especially its corporate brand. Even if it is decided to no longer use a name, it may be advisable to keep it as a defensive measure to prevent a third party from taking it over.

Finally, it should be recalled that the parties must be attentive to the arguments they present before the WIPO, at the risk of departing from the UDRP’s legal regime. Unlike the judge, the expert does not have the power to declare a trademark invalid, nor to conduct investigations for unfair competition.

Keywords: generic designation of domain name – bad faith – trademark right – domain name – unfair competition

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UDRP Procedure: proof of claimed trademark rights must be accurate

WIPO, Arbitration and Mediation Center, March 5, 2020, No. D2019-2887, SYMPHONY HOLDINGS LIMITED V. JAIMIE FULLER, FULLER CONSULTANCY F.Z.E.

 

The first criterion of the UDRP – which generally does not pose any difficulty – consists in the applicant demonstrating that a trademark in which he has rights is recognizable in the disputed domain name.

 

The text of the UDRP Guidelines, available on the ICANN website, is as follows: “Your domain name is identical to, or confusingly similar (note: potentially confusingly similar) to, a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights. It is not clear whether the applicant must simply be the owner of the mark, or whether he must also be the registered owner of that mark.

 

This point must be considered when reading the case of a Bermudan company Symphony Holdings Limited, against the Swiss defendant Jaimie Fuller of Fuller Consultancy concerningthe domain name <skins.net>

 

The applicant, Symphony Holdings Limited, claimed rights in the Australian trademark’SKINS.NET’, which is identical to the domain name. However, the Experts noted that the Symphony Holdings Limited did not appear as the owner of the mark in the databases of the Australian Office.

 

The applicant had submitted a copy of an agreement by which it had acquired a list of assets belonging to SKINS International Trading AG (“SITAG”), the registered owner of the mark.

 

However, this agreement was found to be insufficient, as the precise list of acquired rights was not provided. It was, therefore, not possible to verify that the trademark in question was part of it. All the more so since the contract specifies that all assets are transferred except for those already transferred in 2012 to a Japanese company.

 

This might lead to the conclusion that if the applicant had provided the list of the transferred trademarks, then the claimed trademark would have been accepted by the experts. The experts stated that they could have issued a “panel order”, i.e. a request for additional documentation. However, they did not do so because the dispute seemed too complex to be resolved via the UDRP procedure. In fact, at the time of the auction of SITAG’s assets, the defendant was one of the applicant’s competitors.

It should be noted that the Respondent had itself acquired the domain name in question, which belonged to SITAG, through an agreement.

 

On the one hand, this decision may help to recall a fundamental principle of trade mark law: registrations relating to trade marks should be done, in particular in assignment or licensing cases, in order to avoid being harmed subsequently, in the event of a court action, for example.

 

On the other hand, the decision also emphasizes that the UDRP procedure is not appropriate for all domain name disputes. It is tailored for disputes between a right holder and a cybersquatter. Commercial disputes between companies have no place here.

 

Thus, it is necessary to be vigilant with regard to all aspects of the procedure. The question of rights, which may seem elementary, must be perfectly taken care of in that the absence of valid proof of the trademark right will necessarily lead to the failure of the complaint, even if the case is more obvious than the one currently under discussion.

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Coronavirus: the measures implemented by intellectual property offices to deal with the health crisis

The whole world’s been in slow motion since the Covid-19 virus spread. Thus, state governments are doing their best to maintain the continuity of the administration despite the implementation of containment measures,. Since an ordinance of March 16, the offices have decided to extend procedural deadlines that expired during this period of health crisis.

 

Here’s a list of the provisions that offices have put in place in order to allow better management of procedures related to trademarks, as well as patents.

 

 

  • INPI, The National Institute of Intellectual Property

The INPI decided in its order n°2020-32 of March 16, that the deadlines for proceedings relating to patents, trademarks and designs will be extended to 4 months for procedures concerning patents, trademarks and designs. However, the deadlines for priority for international extensions, for payments for patent and supplementary protection certificate filing, which are subject to supranational provisions, have been excluded.

 

The order adds that “in the event of failure to comply with a deadline, the health crisis will be taken into account when examining the procedures for appealing for restoration or for a forfeiture statement to the INPI. »

 

It should be noted that the bill put in place by the government was adopted by Parliament on March 2: the aim is to enable the Government to legislate by ordinance in many areas, including that of intellectual property. This ordinance thus includes provisions concerning the extension of the deadlines stemming from the Intellectual Property Code, including those relating to the opposition procedure.

In accordance with the new order dated March 25 (No. 2020-306), the INPI extended the delay of deadlines for procedures concerning trademark oppositions, trademark renewals or design extensions : it allows to benefit from thecorresponding grace period or for the filing of an administrative or judicial appeal.

In this way, it extends the deadlines which expire between March 12th and June 23rd. The statutory deadline for taking action runs until July 23rd if the initial deadline was set for one month, and until August 23rd if it was for two months or more.

The INPI is already planning to extend its deadlines until July. In the weeks to come, it will be necessary to closely monitor the news from the office.

 

  • EUIPO, European Union Intellectual Property Office

The Office had stated in its Decision No. EX-20-3 issued on March 16, that all deadlines expiring between 9 March and 30 April 2020 included, would be automatically extended until May 1st, 2020. Since May 1st is a public holiday, the deadlines were therefore extended until May 4, 2020.

 

EUIPO subsequently explained its decision on March 19. By the expression “all deadlines”, it meant all procedural deadlines, whether fixed by the Office or of a statutory nature. “They are stipulated directly in the Implementing Regulation,” with the exception of the deadlines relating to matters not covered by certain regulations, such as that on the European Union trademark (2017/1001). It is therefore applicable to all procedures, whether for trademarks, patents, renewals or opposition proceedings.

More recently, on April 29, WIPO’s Executive Director issued the Decision No. EX-20-4, extending all deadlines expiring between May 1st and May 17, to May 18, in order to further support and assist users during the COVID-19 pandemic.

 

  • WIPO, the International Intellectual Property Organization

In the opinion (No. 7/2020) issued on March 19, WIPO introduced possible remedies for failure to comply with the deadlines under the Madrid system and modalities for the extension of the deadlines when the national offices are closed.

 

With regard to the international registration of trademarks, WIPO added that the extension of the deadlines is automatic in the event that an IP office is not open to the public.  Therefore, if a deadline for a provisional refusal expires on the day an office is closed, it will be extended on the first day following the opening of the office.

 

The opinion adds that, with regard to trademarks, applicants may request the continuation of the procedure without having to justify themselves, in particular for all matters relating to an international trademark application, a request for registration, a request for modification of a subsequent designation, etc…

 

WIPO has also recently announced automatic extensions of the deadlines in cases where a national IP office is closed to the public and in the event of disruption in postal or mail services.

 

In a press release of March 16 and 19, USPTO had announced that it was waiving the late fees in certain situations for applicants affected by the coronavirus, as well as the requirement of an original handwritten signature in ink for certain documents.

 

On April 28, USPTO announced an extension of the deadlines up to May 31, 2020. This means that some actions that were due in this period can be postponed to 1 June. The USPTO gives an extension for certain deadlines between March 27 and April 30. This period runs to 30 days from the original deadline.

 

In order to obtain the extension, applicants or patentees must “submit a declaration that at least one person responsible for the delay has been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, due to office closures, financial problems, inaccessibility of records, illness of a family member, or other similar circumstances. »

 

  • In other countries of the world

-The Canadian Intellectual Property Office is extending the deadline to July 6th, 2020.

The German Patent and Trademark Office affirmed in a statement dated May 11 that the extension of the deadlines will be until June 2.

UKIPO, the United Kingdom Office declared on May 7, 2020 that all deadlines falling on or posterior to March 24, 2020 (being those interrupted days) will be extended to the following interrupted day. The period of interruption will end on July 29th. This extension applies to most deadlines for patents, trademarks, supplementary protection certificates and designs.

The Benelux Organisation for Intellectual Property is the most rigid office. Indeed, in a press release dated March 16, it discloses that trademark applications referring to coronavirus will be refused registration. However, in a press release of March 20, it revised their position by saying that “the BOIP will not withdraw any application or procedure because a given deadline has not been met. This also applies to opposition proceedings not filed on time or to payments not made on time”. These measures will be applicable until May 20, 2020, at least.

 

The WIPO website regularly updates information on the provisions adopted by various intellectual property offices in order to keep abreast of the various communications that offices can make around the world. With the introduction of deconfinement measures in some countries, including France, it will be necessary to closely follow the future news.

 

Dreyfus can assist you in the management of your trademarks portfolios in all countries around the world. Do not hesitate to contact us.

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Tracking system, real-time geolocalisation… digital solutions are being developed to facilitate the gradual deconfinement.

In order to control the coronavirus epidemic, the government plans to create an application called “StopCovid”. Once the Bluetooth function is activated, the application will track who the user has been in contact with in the last 15 minutes and alert them if any of those poeple affirmed to be infected with Covid-19.This method has already been proven effective in some countries, such as China.

Quid juris?

The European Commission has given a favourable opinion on the creation of this application, provided that the data is destroyed once the epidemic is over.

Furthermore, the European Data Protection Supervisor has stated that even in these exceptional circumstances, the controller must guarantee the data protection of the subjects and arrange the least intrusive solutions, by collecting the minimum amount of data.

The CNIL points out that the implementation of such a system requires to be “limited in time” and effectively based on voluntary action and “free and informed consent”. It also recalls the main principles related to the collection of personal data (purpose of processing, transparency, security and confidentiality, proportionality and data minimization).

 

To be continued! “Stop Covid” is only in the early stages of development; it will take several weeks for the application to be perfected.

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Instagram and social networks : what rights do users have in their posted photos?

With the development of social networks, creativity on Internet expanded to a point that it became almost imposible for an artist or a brandto not have their Instagram or Facebook page. The presence on social networks has become an almost essential prerequisite for the reputation of an artist.

The Terms of use of Instagram, especially popular with photographers for exhibiting  their work, provide that users remain as owners of the content they post on the network. However, in several recent cases, photographers have noted their work shared or reposted without being able to oppose.

Therefore, an essential question arises :Do we keep the ownership of the photos we post on social networks ?This question seems to animate the debate between different countries.Inthe US the answer looks negative, while, on the other hand, France seems to be more protective.

 

Precedents on Instagram : The Richard Prince Case

In 2015, Richard Prince, stylist, painter and photographer chose to expose screenshots of the social network Instagram with different pictures without obteining the author’s agreement. He earned more than 100 000 dollars from the sale of these artworks, and the authors of the original pictures didn’t receive any money for this commercial exploitation.

In the United States, this practice falls under the so-called « Fair use » exceptions which alllow an artist to work from an existing picture and to transform it without infringing the copyrights.

 

A circumvention of the law: the Mashable case

 

More recently, the american information website Mashable wanted to publish an article related to the work of ten women photographers. One of them, Stephanie Sinclair, denied Mashable the right of using her artwork. The site therefore bypassed this refusal by using the Instagram network function “embed”, allowing to share content without having to download it. Thus, the image used is only stored on the social network and not on the server of the Mashable website, directly.

The New York Southern District Court, in a judgment given on April 13, 2020, declared that the author of the photographs posted on a public Instagram account could not oppose that an online media integrates them in his articles. In addition, the judge based his decision on the Terms of use of the social network which provide that users grant for each posted image “a non-exclusive right, free of rights, transferable, sublicensable and worldwide“. According to the judge, the integration of an image on a third-party site therefore constitutes a sub-license right.

It is considerated that when a user posts a photo on a public Instagram account, they give their agreement for all use via the « embed » function.

 

Following this decision, the photographer Stephanie Sinclair said she would appeal.

 

What about French law on social networks ?

In France, this statement may be attenuated by articles L.131-1and L.131-3of the Intellectual Property Codewhich prohibit the “global transfer of future works” and provide that “the transmission of the rights of the author is subject to the condition that each of the rights transferred is the subject of a separate mention in the deed of transfer and that the area of ​​exploitation of the rights transferred is defined as to its extent and destination, as to the place and as to the duration”.

Based on this, the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance (High Court of Paris) has already judged unfair, in the Twitter (2018) and Facebook (2019) cases, clauses similar to that invoked by the American judge concerning Instagram.

 

In short, while the struggle of artists in the United States to assert their rights on social networks and particularly on Instagram, seems laborious, it should be noted that French law is more protective of authors and artists. To be continued

 

Dreyfus can assist you in the protection of your rights on social networks in all countries of the world. Do not hesitate to contact us.

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Will trademark non-use due to quarantine be considered a valid reason?

Due to the current health situation, the majority of companies have reduced their activity. This suspension or reduction of activity will have an impact on all intellectual property and may in particular result in the non-use of the trademark by the owner, leading to its forfeiture.

In fact, in accordance with the French law, and more specifically Article L714-5 of the Intellectual Property Code, if a trademark is not used for an uninterrupted period of five years for the goods and services covered by the registration, the court may, order the revocation of the trademark and the cancellation of its registration, at the request of an interested third party

The holder must therefore ensure that there is genuine use during this five-year period, i.e. real exploitation.

Thus, owners of trademarks that had not been exploited before the health crisis and quarantine could not start or resume exploitation. This unprecedented period could therefore lead to a period of non-use of more than five years.

However, the trademark owner may invoke a valid reason justifying the absence of serious use. According to established case law, this just reason must have a direct link with the trademark, be a circumstance outside the control of the trademark owner which has made the use of the trademark impossible or excessively difficult.

Therefore, it seems that the court may consider the restrictions imposed by the Government because of the pandemic as a valid excuse for the non-use of the trademark by the owner. Indeed, this obstacle, which is external to the owner’s will and which has made the use of the trademark extremely difficult, may be qualified as a just cause which will prevent or should lessen the delay of a possible revocation of the trademark.

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