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An e-mail or IP address is not an address within the meaning of EU law

In its decision of July 9, 2020 (case C-264/19), the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that neither an IP address nor an e-mail address are “addresses” under Article 8 of the European Union Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.

 

  1. Un litige opposant une société de distribution à YouTube

A dispute between a distribution company and YouTube

Constantin Film, a German film distribution company, noticed that some of the films it distributed were uploaded on YouTube without its consent. Therefore, the company turned to YouTube to obtain the e-mail and IP addresses of the users who had put this content online.
As YouTube and Google (Google owns YouTube) refused to share such data, the case went to German courts.

Article 8 of the European Union Directive on the enforcement of intellectual property rights provides for the possibility for right holders to request information from infringers and/or persons who have provided services to them, here YouTube, about “the origin and distribution networks of goods or services which infringe an intellectual property right”, including the “names and addresses” of the persons involved.

The German Federal Court has questioned whether e-mail and IP addresses should be considered “addresses” within the meaning of the Directive. The German Court decided to stay the proceedings and referred to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on whether such information falls within the meaning of the term “address” in the Directive 2004/48.

 

2. A definition of “address” that does not include IP and e-mail addresses

The answer of the CJEU is clear: EU law does not assimilate IP addresses and e-mail addresses with addresses.
The notion of address in the above-mentioned article must be understood in the sense of a postal address.

In its press release No.88/20 of July 9, 2020, the Court states that: “as regards the usual meaning of the term ‘address’, it refers only to the postal address, that is to say, the place of a given person’s permanent address or habitual residence” when used without any further clarification.
Nevertheless, the CJEU indicates that Member States may grant holders of intellectual property rights a more extensive right to information.
In the above-mentioned press release, the Court specifically mentions, regarding Article 8 of the 2004/48 directive, that “the aim of that provision is to reconcile compliance with various rights, inter alia the right of holders to information and the right of users to protection of personal data”.

 

 

This decision limits the range of action of right holders, for whom it is increasingly difficult to identify persons infringing on their assets. In addition to this issue of IP addresses and e-mails that do not fall within the scope of what is understood by “address”, The Data Protection Regulation, known as the GDPR, of April 27, 2016, has also complexifed the defence of rights on the Internet, as privacy has been increased and information on the holders of domain names redacted.

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Fashion ID & Facebook : a joint liability subject to debate

Like many digital players, Fashion ID inserted a Facebook “Like” button on its website. This plug-in automatically collects and transmits to Facebook the personal data of the website users, whether or not they click on the button, and whether or not they have a Facebook account. This process takes place without any control by the website operator. Arguing that users’ rights are being infringed, a consumer association brought an action before the German court in order to stop this infringement. On 20 January 2017, the competent trial court referred several questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The main question is whether the integration of this “Like” button is sufficient to make Fashion ID a ‘data controller’ (jointly with Facebook), for the purpose of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, which has now been replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation of 27 April 2016 (GDPR).

 

Although the Court must rule on the notion of joint liability and the consequences of such liability in the light of Directive 95/46/EC, which has now been replaced by the GDPR. Both texts define the data controller in the same way. As a result, the scope of the CJEU decision will most likely go beyond the present case. Aware of the stakes involved in this future decision, Advocate General Michel Bobek, in his Opinion of 19 December 2018, expressed his support for joint liability between Fashion ID and Facebook.

 

In the past, the CJEU has already recognised the administrator of a Facebook page as a data controller who had freely chosen to host the page on Facebook and therefore could set up the statistical processing carried out by the social network (CJEU, “Wirtschaftsakademie”, 5 June 2018, C-210/16). The Court also said that this liability might be retained even if no direct processing is carried out by the page administrator (CJEU, 10 July 2018, “Jehovan”, C-25/17). The CJEU has therefore adopted a broad understanding of the notion of joint liability.

 

In his Opinion, Advocate General Bobek has invited the Court to reduce the scope of joint liability in order to better identify the liability of each involved. He considers that extending the notion of data controller to any third party allowing the processing in any way would actually dilute the liability, making the protection of individuals less effective. For this reason, he proposes to link the definition of data controller with the purpose of the processing operation, which must be unique in its means and purpose.

 

This approach requires splitting the processing into as many subprocesses as there are purposes to get to the part in which the website operator exercises effective control. This approach would limit the website operator’s liability to the processing phase for which he is actually responsible and would not include subsequent processing operations beyond his control. In this instance, Facebook and Fashion ID pursue a commercial and advertising purpose. Therefore, Facebook should be solely liable for processing operations carried out after the data collection, while Fashion ID’s liability would be limited to the collection and transmission of such data. However, this solution proposed by the Advocate General has several disadvantages.

 

Thus, reducing the notion of purpose to the functions of the processing, (i.e. the technical operations of collection), conceals the advertising purpose. However, users should be able to anticipate this. The processing cannot be examined as a whole and an analysis of its compliance with regard to the consequences for the persons concerned is not possible. In the end, adopting this narrow approach would exempt website operators from requiring the disclosure of information from their operating partners that would effectively inform users, because the different data controllers involved would not be required to know the processing operations carried out by their partners.

 

Indeed, a data controller could try to evade responsibility by arguing his actions did not cause damage and try to put blame on all others who have beeen held to be joint data controllers. Such presumption of solidarity could be considered if the provisions of Article 26 GDPR (requiring joint controllers to transparently determine responsibilities) are not met.

 

Moreover, the Advocate General does not address the question of cascading responsibilities. Indeed, in the case of multiple data controllers, a new division of the processing operation would have to be carried out under this solution. For example, if Facebook provides data to a partner, the company will have limited liability and it would be up to its partner to enforce the GDPR.

An extensive interpretation of joint liability in cascade would force operators to identify the relevant mechanisms for ensuring respect for the rights of individuals.

 

The choice of an extensive or restricted interpretation of joint liability now rests with the CJEU. Its decision is therefore highly anticipated since it will have a direct impact on website publishers and the protection of private individuals’ personal data.

 

Dreyfus assists its clients worldwide in their strategies to protect and defend their rights on the Internet. Do not hesitate to contact us!

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Towards the protection of culinary creations by certificate?

To the delight of our taste buds, flavors and gourmet creations are part of our daily lives, but from a legal perspective, the situation is more delicate and the flavor more bitter. Indeed, there is a consensus on the need to protect culinary creations but intellectual property law currently offers only peripheral protection.

 

As we saw in a previous article, cooking recipes can be protected by author rights, the aesthetics or visual appearance of the creation is covered by designs, innovative techniques used in the creation may give rise to patent protection and the name can be registered as a trademark. None of these solutions protect the actual creations themselves. In addition, certain conditions must be met, which may not reflect practice. Under these circumstances, the most appropriate solution is usually author rights protection, which is intended to protect an original creation regardless of its form of expression (Article L. 112-1 of the French Intellectual Property Code). Nevertheless, the Court of justice of the European Union (ECJ, 13 November 2018, “Levola”, C 310/17) has refused to protect flavors in this way. The French Cour de Cassation has adopted a similar position on fragrances (Cass. Com., 10 December 2013, n°19872). In short, when it comes to culinary creations, the law remains speechless.

 

In order to fill this legal void, several deputies have submitted to the National Assembly a bill about the protection of recipes and culinary creations, on April 30, 2019.

 

The main purpose of the text is to clarify the situation of traditional recipes on one hand and culinary creations on the other hand.

 

Thus, the creation of a new institution, the “Fondation pour la gastronomie française”, is envisaged. This private non-profit legal entity would be in charge of listing and protecting traditional recipes in order to identify restaurateurs who respect them. The aim is to promote the knowledge, conservation and enhancement of French gastronomy as well as reassuring consumers.

 

Moreover, the bill provides for the creation of a public institution, the “Institut national de la création culinaire certifiée” (INCC), to ensure the protection of culinary creations. The INCC would issue a new industrial property title, the certificate of culinary creation, to provide protection for a period of 20 years. A hybrid between author rights and industrial property rights, this title includes economic rights as well as three moral rights (right of disclosure, right to the name, right to respect for culinary creation).

 

The conditions for granting such a certificate are:

  • the creation must be new with respect to the state of the culinary art;
  • the existence of a creative activity, not resulting in an obvious way from the state of the art for a skilled person;
  • an own gustatory character.

 

The bill excludes from protection a number of productions such as creations involving elements of the human body, narcotics or creations violating public order. The text also provides a specific regime for employees’ creations, close to the one existing in author rights, as well as an opposition procedure lasting two months from the publication of the application for the grant of a culinary creation certificate. Unsurprisingly, any infringement to this new property right would constitute an act of counterfeiting.

 

This bill, being a combination of trademark law and author rights, is not convincing. The Chefs themselves do not appear to be asking for such protection and the measure will probably mainly benefit the food industries. The bill has now been referred to the Committee on Cultural Affairs and Education. This is a case to follow.

 

Specializing in intellectual property, Dreyfus will know how to create the perfect recipe to enhance and protect your rights. Do not hesitate to contact us!

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Spain: Proof of use of the trademark, a new mean of defense in opposition proceedings

On April 30, Spain finalized the reform of its trademark law, started in late 2018. From that date, the Royal Decree 306/2019 of 26 April 2019 amending the Regulations under Spanish Trademark Act 17/2001 entered into force.

 

The possibility to request proof of use in defense in opposition proceedings is one of the main innovations introduced into Spanish law by the 2018 reform. The European Union already provides for such a means of defense in article 47 of the European Union Trademark Regulation (EUTR). Thus, this reform of Spanish law is part of the welcome European harmonization.

 

The Royal Decree 306/2019, under discussion, establishes how this new defense will be implemented.

 

Thus, from now on, proof of use may be required for all opposition proceedings filed since May 1, 2019.

 

This mean of defense can be invoked against Spanish trademarks and trade names and against international trademarks designating Spain. However, not all prior right can be contested. To be challenged, the prior trademark or trade name must have been registered for at least five years. The holder of such prior rights will then have the burden of proof of the actual exploitation of the rights claimed.

 

If the evidence provided is insufficient, then the opposition request will be rejected. The relevant prior right or the existence of a likelihood of confusion will not be taken into consideration for the resolution of the dispute.

 

In this respect, the documents provided as evidence must refer to the goods and/or services for which the prior right is registered. If the opposition is based on part of the goods and/or services, then the right holder must provide the proof of a genuine use only for those goods and/or services. The supporting evidences must establish the real and serious exploitation of the prior right. This exploitation is established when products and/or services are offered for sale and put into the market.

 

The documents communicated must indicate the place, date, extent and nature of the sign’s use. For example, that may be catalogues, brochures, invoices, labels, advertisements, etc. Items provided by third parties constitute concrete and independent evidence. As such, their probative value is higher than the value given by the prior trademark owner’s evidence.

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Nathalie Dreyfus has been admitted as panelist and arbitrator in the CIRA Panel

Nathalie Dreyfus has been admitted as panelist and arbitrator in the CIRA Panel (Canadian Internet Registration Authority).

The CIRA Panel is a new Alternative Dispute Resolution Centre which belongs to the British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre (BCICAC).

The main aim of CIRA is to settle disputes concerning domain names through a quick and relatively low cost mechanism, led by out-of-court arbitrators who meet certain requirements according to CIRA’s Canadian Presence.   

The process is initiated by a complaint received in the CIRA Complaint Center which locks the disputed domain. A copy of the complaint is redirected to the Registrant who has twenty days to deliver a response. If so, a Panel of experts is appointed, whereas if there is no response the complainant may elect a single panelist. In both cases, a decision is given within twenty one days.

This decision is directly implemented by the CIRA.Since BCICAC was founded more than hundred cases have been solved by this institution.

 

Dreyfus can assist you in the management of your trademarks portfolios in all countries of the world. Do not hesitate to contact us.

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“Karawan” and “Caravan”: sign used as a reference, potential trademark infringement.

According to the judgment “Société Roche Bobois Groupe v. Société Caravane” of 23 January 2019, n° 17-18693, the French Cour de cassation held that a sign used to reference a piece of furniture may constitute a trademark infringement. In the present case, Roche Bobois had marketed sofas referenced as “Karawan”. Caravane, considering this exploitation damaging, sued Roche Bobois for infringement of its “Caravane” trademarks (both French and international).

 

Asserting that the use of a sign as a reference is common in the furniture sector, Roche Bobois claimed that the consumer was not likely to think that the sign “Karawan” was an indicator or origin of the products and is therefore not used as a trademark. Thus, Roche Bobois claimed that there was no infringement of the trademark “Caravane”. In its decision, the French Cour de Cassation ruled in favor of Caravane. The Court states that “the presence of the trademark “Roche Bobois” and the marketing of the products in a store dedicated to this trademark were not such as to remove the function of the disputed sign as an indicator of origin”.

 

The French Cour de Cassation  applied article L. 713-3 b) of the French Intellectual Property Code, which prohibitsThe imitation of a mark and the use of an imitated mark for goods or services that are identical or similar to those designated in the registration.”

 

As such, Roche Bobois was counterfeiting. Indeed, the Court held that the sign “Karawan” was not solely used as a sign to reference but as a trademark. Relying on different indicators, the Court found that the sign was used as trademark. Indeed, the sign “Karawan” was not only written in large letters and clearly displayed on advertising posters but the trademark “Roche Bobois” was not clearly visible to the customer (at the bottom of the advertising posters, in small characters, etc.). Furthermore, a Google search combining the terms “sofas” and “Karawan” led to products of Roche Bobois. The sign was therefore not used for referencing purposes but solely for distinguishing and individualizing products as being those of Roche Bobois. Then, there was a risk of confusion in the minds of the public between the trademark “Caravan” and the designation “Karawan”. As a consequence, the use of the sign “Karawan” by Roche Bobois infringed the “Caravan” trademark.

 

The use of a sign as a reference is common practice in the furniture sector, but the decision of the French Cour de Cassation requires companies resorting to this practice to be more careful in the choice and the use of a sign as a reference. It is essential to avoid any risk of confusion in the minds of the public. The trademark associated with the marketed product must therefore be clearly visible and distinct of the sign used to reference.

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Trademark reform package – Changes regarding the invalidity proceedings

Our study of the draft orders transposing the Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, leads us today to examine the invalidity action. The owner of an earlier mark who is instituting invalidity proceedings may now be opposed by the defendant non-use of the earlier mark. In addition, the invalidity action becomes imprescriptible.

Non-use is a defense in invalidity proceedings

As French law currently stands, a trademark cannot be registered if it consists of:

Only the graphical representation requirement is removed by the draft orders. The other conditions of validity of a mark are still grounds for invalidity proceedings. The owner of prior rights may request the invalidation a trademark infringing his rights, while the public prosecutor may request it pursuant to all the other conditions of validity (Article L. 714-3). The owner of a well-known trademark may also initiate invalidity proceedings against a trademark registered subsequently to his own (Article L. 714-4).

The French draft orders introduce the possibility to raise as a defense in invalidity proceedings the non-use of the prior trademark. In other words, the owner of a challenged mark may argue in defense that the earlier mark has not been used seriously for an uninterrupted period of five years. The plaintiff must provide proof of this serious use. Thereupon, there are two scenarios under the new Article L. 716-2-3.

  • If the earlier trademark has been registered for more than five years prior to the date of the institution of the invalidity proceedings, but less than five years before the filing of the later trademark: the owner of the mark thus challenged must provide proof of serious use during the five years preceding his application or provide adequate reasons for this non-use;
  • If the earlier trademark has been registered for more than five years at the time that the later trademark is filed: the owner of the mark thus challenged will have to provide proof of serious use for the five years preceding the filing of the prior trademark and during the five years preceding his application. Here again, only adequate reasons for its non-use will be able to excuse lack of serious use.

Invalidity proceedings become imprescriptible

Invalidity proceedings are currently subject to the ordinary law prescription provided by article 2224 of the French Civil Code, namely “five years from the day the holder of a right knew or should have known the facts enabling him to exercise his right”. Article L. 714-3 of the French Intellectual Property Code furthermore states that a trademark owner cannot institute invalidity proceedings if the contested trademark “was filed in good faith and if he had tolerated its use for five years”.

The French draft orders make invalidity proceedings imprescriptible in a new Article L. 716-2-6. Only well-known trademarks, within the meaning of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, will remain subject to a statute of limitations of five years from the date of registration, unless the application has been made in bad faith (Article L. 716-2-7, new).

It can be argued that making invalidity proceedings imprescriptible weakens the rights of trademark owners because their rights can be challenged at any time..

The new measures put in place by the French draft orders transposing the “trademark reform package” must therefore encourage trademark owners to check with great care the validity of their sign before registering it as a trademark.

To be continued…

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The EUIPO and EURid have launched a new monitoring service for .eu and .ею domain name registrations.

On May 20 2019, EUIPO and EURid, the European Registry for Internet Domains, announced in two separate press releases that they have launched a new monitoring service for domain names in .eu and .ею (See EUIPO press release and EURid press release).

According to these two press releases, this new service aims at fighting cybersquatting and bad faith domain name registrations. Since May 18, 2019, applicants and holders of European Union trademarks may opt in to receive an alert as soon as a .eu or .ею domain name, identical to their European Union trademark application, is registered.

It is specified that this new service is advantageous both in terms of speed and efficiency. It allows applicants and holders of European Union trademarks to be informed of the registration of these domain names more quickly than if they would have to monitor registrations themselves, and they are thus able to act more quickly if necessary. In addition, this service will also detect earlier the registrations of other domain names by third parties, in the event of multiple bad faith domain names registrations.

Finally, these two press releases specify the that EUIPO and EURid have collaborated since 2016 and that they signed a second letter of collaboration at the Annual Meeting of the International Trademark Association (INTA) in Boston, which was held from May 18 to May 22, 2019, thus strengthening the collaboration between these two entities.

Dreyfus is a specialist in domain names matters and can assist you in managing your domain name portfolio.

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United Kingdom: The Trademark Office no longer collects and forwards to WIPO fees when registering an International trademark.

The United Kingdom Office has withdrawn its notification made under Rule 34 (2) (b) of the Common Regulations applicable to the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol.

As a result, since May 6, 2019, the United Kingdom Office no longer collects and forwards to the International Bureau of WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization) the fees due under these regulations.

In other words, any payment of these fees pursuant to a registration requested of the United Kingdom Office must be made directly to WIPO, as is already the case in France. As a result of this administrative change, a payment can now be made in four ways:

– By debiting a WIPO current account;

– By credit card, but only for payments of fees related to renewal of registered marks, notification of irregularities issued by the Office, or for additional fees relating to the designation of additional contracting parties after the trademark has been registered. Such payments are made in Swiss francs and require a WIPO reference number;

– By bank transfer;

– By postal transfer for inter-European payments.

 

To be handled correctly, payments by bank transfer must include the name and complete address of the payer, the transaction code (EN), the trademark number, the trademark name, if available, or its verbal elements, and the name of the trademark holder, if different from the payer. In the case of multiple requests, a list containing each request and the amount paid for each request is also required.

It is important to pay all fees in full, otherwise an irregularity notification will be issued. This notification shall specify a payment period beyond which the request shall be deemed to have been abandoned.

As the United Kingdom Registrar no longer makes these payments to WIPO, it is up to the applicant or his representative to be vigilant and diligent when making them.

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Trademark reform package – Administrative procedure before the INPI for invalidity proceedings and trademark revocation

One of the main innovations introduced by the “Trademark Package” Directive of 16 December 2015 (2015/2436 EU) is the introduction of an administrative procedure for revocation or declaration of invalidity. Some countries, such as Great Britain or Germany, have already introduced this new scheme into their legislation, but this was not the case in France. As the Directive did not specify how this new procedure must be implemented, the Government undertook this task with its draft project of the “Trademark reform Package”. The draft orders introduce several new articles in the French intellectual property Code (CPI) which aim at regulating how this administrative procedure can be implemented before the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI).

Until now, pursuant to article R. 712-17 of the CPI, the INPI only addressed the issue  of revocation for non-use if it was introduced by  a trademark owner in an opposition proceeding. The French draft orders make the INPI competent to judge an application for revocation or invalidity of a trademark in a larger number of cases.

 

The INPI thus becomes primarily competent to deal with applications for invalidity and revocations of trademarks, even if there is no pending litigation. The courts remain competent to deal with counterclaims, asking the court to revoke or invalidate a trademark, and for applications for invalidity as a principal based on commercial names, domain names or author rights. More generally, courts remain exclusively competent to deal with other civil actions and trademark claims, including related issues of unfair competition. The same applies for invalidity or revocation applications’ presented in a case of an infringement request (as a principal or counterclaim), or when provisional or protective measures are being enforced (Articles L 411-4 and L. 716-5 new).

 

The administrative procedure before the INPI is provided by the articles L. 716-1 and R. 716-1 to R. 716-11 (new) and includes an adversarial investigation phase. The INPI must decide on the application of invalidity or revocation within three months of the end of this phase, otherwise the application is deemed to have been rejected.

The application for invalidity or revocation submitted to the INPI must include:

– the identity of the applicant;

– the indications allowing to establish the existence, nature, origin and scope of the prior rights invoked;

– the references of the trademark and the goods or services covered by the application for invalidity or revocation;

– the presentation of the means;

– the proof of  payment of the fee (within one month);

– the authorization of a potential representative.

 

This request must be carefully prepared since once it has been made its basis and scope cannot be extended.

The instruction phase begins with the notification to the owner of the contested trademark of the action filed against him. This leads to adversarial exchanges through written observations. These written exchanges between the parties may be punctuated by oral observations. Once the instruction phase has been completed, the INPI decides on the application.

In this respect, all these INPI decisions ruling on an application for revocation or invalidity must be reasoned   (Article L. 411-5, new) and may be the subject of an action for invalidity or reform before the French Court of appeals of the applicant’s place of residence (Articles L. 411-4-1 and R. 411-19, new).

 

With this new administrative procedure, it is no longer mandatory to go to court. However, the invalidity of a trademark is often part of a broader litigation, which may itself concern several titles. Not all the multiple issues thus raised will be within the competence of the INPI. Consequently, the judicial judge will recover exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the case (e.g. if there is a related issue of unfair competition). Although his jurisdiction will be mainly limited to counterclaims for revocation and invalidity, the judicial judge is therefore not entirely set apart from this new procedure. The courts will retain their jurisdiction over  the more complex cases, and their role will thus be complementary to the role assigned to the INPI.

Though the INPI is given greater jurisdiction, it is unlikely that the new procedure will be less costly, simpler, and faster and that it will indeed  declutter the INPI’s registry from  many unused trademark, as it was expected.

 

To be continued…

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